

(Sequential) Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices

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Digital Signatures (Informal)




Motivation:

- Digital analogue of handprint signature
- Even more secure?
- Even more functionalities?

Digital Signatures (Formal)

$\Pi_S = (\text{KGen}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$




message 

$(sk, vk) \leftarrow \text{KGen}$



$\text{Sig}(\text{sk}, \text{message}) = \text{document with pencil icon}$



$\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{Vf}(vk, \text{document with pencil icon})$

Signature is **valid** if $1 \leftarrow \text{Vf}$.

Properties

Correctness


Unforgeability

Applications

Authentication

Multiple Signatures




message 

$(sk_1, vk_1) \leftarrow \text{KGen}$


$$\text{document icon}_1, \text{pencil icon}_1 = \text{Sig}(sk_1, \text{document icon}_1)$$



message 

$(sk_2, vk_2) \leftarrow \text{KGen}$

$$\text{document icon}_2, \text{pencil icon}_2 = \text{Sig}(sk_2, \text{document icon}_2)$$



$$\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{Vf}(vk_1, \text{document icon}_1, \text{pencil icon}_1)$$

$$\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{Vf}(vk_2, \text{document icon}_2, \text{pencil icon}_2)$$


Q: Can we combine both $(\text{document icon}_1, \text{pencil icon}_1)$ and $(\text{document icon}_2, \text{pencil icon}_2)$ to something shorter?

And more generally for $N \gg 2$ many signatures?

1




(Sequential) Aggregate Signatures Based on Lattices



2

3




Aggregate Signatures: AggSig and AggVf [BGLS03]



$$\text{sk}_j = \text{Sig}(sk_j, \text{msg}_j) \text{ for } j = 1, 2$$

$$vk = (vk_1, vk_2)$$

$$\text{agg} \leftarrow \text{AggSig}(vk, \text{msg}_1, \text{msg}_2, \text{sk}_1, \text{sk}_2)$$



$$\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{AggVf}(vk, \text{msg}_1, \text{msg}_2, \text{agg})$$

only public input

Properties

Correctness

Unforgeability

Compactness

Public aggregation

Applications

Consensus Protocols

Certificate Chains


Aggregate Signatures: AggSig and AggVf [BGLS03]



$\text{sk}_j = \text{Sig}(sk_j, \text{doc}_j)$ for $j = 1, 2$

$vk = (vk_1, vk_2)$

$\text{agg} \leftarrow \text{AggSig}(vk, \text{doc}_1, \text{doc}_2, \text{sk}_1, \text{sk}_2)$



$\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{AggVf}(vk, \text{doc}_1, \text{doc}_2, \text{agg})$

Properties

Correctness


Unforgeability

Compactness

Public aggregation

hard to obtain!

Sequential Aggregation: SeqSig and SeqVf [LMRS04]



Properties

Correctness

Compactness

Unforgeability

Applications

Certification Chains

Authenticated Network Routing Protocols

Smart Production

Research Question:

Can we construct a
(sequential) aggregate signature scheme
based on **Euclidean lattices**?

Fail:

public aggregation
ia.cr/2021/263
accepted at CFAIL'22

Success:

sequential aggregation
soon on e-print



Signatures on Lattices [Lyu12]

Let $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$, $R_q = R/qR$ and $A' \leftarrow U(R_q^{k \times \ell})$ defining $A = [A' | I_k]$ and $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow C \subseteq R$ be a random oracle



(KGen) $sk = s \leftarrow R^{k+\ell}$ small
 $vk = t = As \bmod q$

Correctness:

$$\begin{aligned} Az &= A(sc + y) \\ &= (As)c + Ay \\ &= t \cdot H(u, \text{doc}, t) + u \end{aligned}$$

(Sig) $y \leftarrow R^{k+\ell}$ small, $u = Ay \bmod q$
 $c = H(u, \text{doc}, t) \in R$ small
 $z = s \cdot c + y$ (rejection sampling)

$$\frac{\text{doc}, \text{pencil}}{\longrightarrow} = (u, z)$$

(Vf)
if $Az \stackrel{?}{=} t \cdot H(u, \text{doc}, t) + u$
and z small, accept

Unforgeability Based on Lattices

Theorem ([Lyu12])

Assuming the hardness of the lattice problem Module LWE, the signature is secure against forgeries.

Module Learning With Errors (Module LWE): Distinguish

$$\left\{ \underbrace{A'}_{\ell} \right\}_k, \underbrace{A' \parallel I_k}_A \parallel s \stackrel{c}{\equiv} A', b$$

where $s \leftarrow R^{\ell+k}$ small and $(A', b) \leftarrow U(R_q^{k \times \ell} \times R_q^k)$.

- Presumably post-quantum secure
- Strong security guarantees
- Many cryptographic applications

Public Aggregation - First Attempt



$$sk_1 = s_1, vk_1 = t_1 = As_1$$

$$u_1 = Ay_1$$

$$c_1 = H(u_1, \text{doc}_1, t_1)$$

$$z_1 = s_1 c_1 + y_1 \text{ (rej. sampling)}$$

$$\text{sig}_1 = (u_1, z_1)$$



$$sk_2 = s_2, vk_2 = t_2 = As_2$$

$$u_2 = Ay_2$$

$$c_2 = H(u_2, \text{doc}_2, t_2)$$

$$z_2 = s_2 c_2 + y_2 \text{ (rej. sampling)}$$

$$\text{sig}_2 = (u_2, z_2)$$

💡 Naive idea: $\text{sig} = (u, z) = (u_1 + u_2, z_1 + z_2)$ $(\forall f)$ $Az = t_1 c_1 + t_2 c_2 + u$

✗ Problem: How to compute c_1, c_2 ? Verifier doesn't know u_1, u_2

⚙️ Half-aggregation: $\text{sig} = (u_1, u_2, z), z = z_1 + z_2$



Half-Aggregation - Fail!

Single signature:  = (u, z) Verification: $Az = t \cdot H(u, \text{doc}, t) + u$

Smaller signature:  = (c, z) Verification: $c = H(Az - tc, \text{doc}, t)$

Half-aggregation:  = $(u_1, u_2, z_1 + z_2)$

Trivial:  = (c_1, z_1, c_2, z_2)

Fail:  $> |(u_1, u_2)| > |(c_1, z_1, c_2, z_2)| = $

Dilithium 3: 8.8 KB 1.6 KB

More details ia.cr/2021/263

Sequential Aggregate Signature



$$sk_1 = s_1, vk_1 = t_1 = As_1$$

Sig(sk_1, doc_1):

$$u_1 = Ay_1$$

$$c_1 = H(u_1, \text{doc}_1, t_1)$$

$$z_1 = s_1 c_1 + y_1 \text{ (rej. sampling)}$$

$$\text{sig}_1 = (u_1, z_1)$$



$$sk_2 = s_2, vk_2 = t_2 = As_2$$

SeqSig($sk_2, \text{doc}_2, \text{doc}_1, \text{sig}_1$):

$$u_2 = Ay_2 + u_1$$

$$c_2 = H(u_2, \text{doc}_2, t_2, z_1)$$

$$z_2 = s_2 c_2 + y_2 \text{ (rej. sampling)}$$

$$\text{sig}_2 = (u_2, z_1, z_2)$$



$$\text{SeqVf}(vk, \text{doc}_1, \text{doc}_2, \text{sig}_2): u_2 + c_2 \cdot t_2 - Az_2 = u_1$$

$$\rightarrow \text{sig}_1 = (u_1, z_1)$$

$$\rightarrow \text{Vf}(vk_1, \text{doc}_1, \text{sig}_1)$$


Theorem

If $\Pi_S = (\text{KGen}, \text{Sig}, \text{Vf})$ is secure against forgeries, so is $\Pi_{SAS} = (\text{KGen}, \text{Sig}, \text{SeqSig}, \text{SeqVf})$ secure against forgeries as well.

- Without Forking Lemma \rightarrow better tightness
- Recall: Π_S is secure assuming lattice problem Module LWE
- In the Random Oracle Model

Parameters

After N sequential aggregations:

Sequential aggregation:  $= (u_N, z_1, \dots, z_N)$
Trivial:  $= (c_1, \dots, c_N, z_1, \dots, z_N)$

Starts to be an improvement when

$$nk \log_2 q = |u_N| < |(c_1, \dots, c_N)| = Nn \log_2 3$$

Dilithium Level 3: $N > 69$

Related Works and Open Questions

Related work

- Inter-active aggregation of FSwA-signatures (aka multi-signatures) [[DOTT21](#), [BTT22](#)]
- Sequential half-aggregation of GPV-signatures [[BB14](#), [WW19](#)]

Open questions ?

- Non-trivial signatures on lattices with public aggregation and security proof

Thank you.

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